We want to include your experience and expertise in our final Report due out in January 2010. Please read the piece below and jot down your thoughts – whether it’s a related story, useful data, or unasked question. If you’ve written on this subject before, please upload your work to share with the Commission.
We’ll include your best ideas in our final report, and all valid comments will be included in an online appendix. Thanks for your valuable input!
I wholeheartedly agree with the recommendations in this paper. However, I think it is also important not to take too narrow a focus on this issue.
We are now in an era of recurrent and emerging disease threats that argues for a long-term strategic approach to global health preparedness by the United States.
The emergence of SARS, H5N1 (avian) and H1N1 (swine-origin) influenza has raised awareness of the interdependence of human and economic security, of the ethical questions around equitable distribution of critical health commodities, and of the need for more systematic global preparation for sudden public health crises. While the current H1N1 pandemic has demonstrated recent progress in pandemic preparedness, it has also underscored existing inequalities between industrialized and developing countries, and the need to act preemptively to forestall future disease threats.
U.S. engagement in global pandemic preparedness is fundamentally about improving human security. Creating developing country capacities to cope with emerging disease threats not only serves U.S. self interest; it is an investment in the well-being of the world’s poorest individuals. Pandemic preparedness is a smart way of building for the long-term security of vulnerable communities, and is an area where the U.S. has great expertise and can easily expand upon its current efforts.
The 2005 publication of the World Health Organization’s updated International Health Regulations (IHRs)(1) and their entry into force in 2007 signaled a normative shift in the responsibility of states to build both their own and global capacities to respond to emerging disease threats, at least in part by reducing the risk of inter-state spread of disease that could threaten the sovereign interests of other states. Although they contain no enforcement mechanisms, the IHRs do commit states to actively collaborate in creating a collective global welfare and provide an important framework that can facilitate the improvement of public health preparedness on a global scale. That process, however, also requires stronger external incentives for developing countries to invest in building their own capacities.
In addition, concerns about post-9/11 bioterrorism and the global spread of avian influenza spurred the United States to undertake several early steps to begin strengthening global preparedness. Since 2004 the United States has expanded training and improved laboratory capacity in developing countries; accelerated its own domestic preparedness planning at and between federal, state, and local levels; invested diplomatically in shaping a common international approach to avian influenza.
Despite these early advances in responding to emerging disease threats, two looming gaps remain that will require sustained long-range solutions: (1) a need to increase health preparedness capacities, especially disease surveillance in the developing world, where they are weakest; and (2) a need for multilateral mechanisms to arrange more equitable access of countries to medications, vaccines and other public health commodities critical during public health emergencies.
The United States has an important role to play in addressing these gaps and reaching the goal of improving human security in the developing world. Ultimately, decreasing the time required to respond to emerging health problems within developing countries will improve the overall health preparedness of the entire global community. To help reach this goal, the U.S. should utilize its special leadership assets, its domestic preparedness experience, and its expertise in training field epidemiologists and other public health workers. The United States should also ensure that all efforts to improve preparedness capacity in developing countries contribute to the larger goal of strengthening the overall capacities of national health systems.
Taking a long-term perspective will need to be a critical component of U.S. involvement in global health preparedness, as will heavily involving individual countries in all decisions about improving pandemic preparedness within their own borders and paying closer attention to emerging zoonotic diseases.
Options for expanded U.S. engagement in global preparedness over the next 15 years include: